Data-driven auction design for blockchain-based digital asset trading: A mixed method

Yifang Ding; Su Xiu Xu; Meng Cheng; Sini Guo; Xiang T.R. Kong; George Q. Huang

doi:10.1016/j.omega.2025.103482

Data-driven auction design for blockchain-based digital asset trading: A mixed method

Yifang Ding
, Su Xiu Xu^*
, Meng Cheng
, Sini Guo
, Xiang T.R. Kong
, George Q. Huang

^*此作品的通讯作者

Beijing Institute of Technology
Shenzhen Polytechnic
Shenzhen University
Hong Kong Polytechnic University

科研成果: 期刊稿件 › 文章 › 同行评审

摘要

This paper is motivated by a real project with a leading culture assets and equity swap organization in South China. Our preliminary survey assesses the potential of digital collectibles swap, with professionals aiming to boost liquidity and consumers driven by social attributes and meta-item diversity. In our setting, each agent owns a digital asset and wants another meta-item. However, the traditional Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction runs at a deficit. We thus introduce a novel mechanism that combines the VCG auction with limited supply and platform escrow concepts, called LSE-VCG auction. To improve the surplus of platform (auctioneer), we use limited supply to constrain the number of winners and platform escrow to increase market demand. The LSE-VCG auction and its externality-inclusive variant satisfy both truthful telling and participation rationality. If multilateral matching achieves maximal social welfare, then the substitute condition does not hold (impossibility theorem). We prove that the platform's surplus can be improved by limited supply in some conditions. Our experimental results show that the VCG auction solely with limited supply could reach greater social welfare, agents’ profits and ratio of swap relative to the sequential Vickrey auctions. Moreover, a mix of limited supply and platform escrow schemes can further improve the platform's profit and successful trading ratio. For the platform, truthful telling is a desirable strategy that brings high revenues, which promotes a transparent and beneficial auction environment. Besides, the impacts of externalities, auction timing, market size, value distribution and size of XOR bids are investigated. Furthermore, our auction mechanism is likely effective in addressing large-scale problems. Finally, we apply four effective machine learning methods to predict the limited supply number with partial information before the auction.

源语言	英语
文章编号	103482
期刊	Omega (United Kingdom)
卷	141
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2025.103482
出版状态	已出版 - 6月 2026
已对外发布	是

访问文件

10.1016/j.omega.2025.103482

其它文件与链接

链接到 Scopus 的出版物

引用此

@article{e4f6f2b2c3a5419cb5453341d5d64b0d,

title = "Data-driven auction design for blockchain-based digital asset trading: A mixed method",

abstract = "This paper is motivated by a real project with a leading culture assets and equity swap organization in South China. Our preliminary survey assesses the potential of digital collectibles swap, with professionals aiming to boost liquidity and consumers driven by social attributes and meta-item diversity. In our setting, each agent owns a digital asset and wants another meta-item. However, the traditional Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction runs at a deficit. We thus introduce a novel mechanism that combines the VCG auction with limited supply and platform escrow concepts, called LSE-VCG auction. To improve the surplus of platform (auctioneer), we use limited supply to constrain the number of winners and platform escrow to increase market demand. The LSE-VCG auction and its externality-inclusive variant satisfy both truthful telling and participation rationality. If multilateral matching achieves maximal social welfare, then the substitute condition does not hold (impossibility theorem). We prove that the platform's surplus can be improved by limited supply in some conditions. Our experimental results show that the VCG auction solely with limited supply could reach greater social welfare, agents{\textquoteright} profits and ratio of swap relative to the sequential Vickrey auctions. Moreover, a mix of limited supply and platform escrow schemes can further improve the platform's profit and successful trading ratio. For the platform, truthful telling is a desirable strategy that brings high revenues, which promotes a transparent and beneficial auction environment. Besides, the impacts of externalities, auction timing, market size, value distribution and size of XOR bids are investigated. Furthermore, our auction mechanism is likely effective in addressing large-scale problems. Finally, we apply four effective machine learning methods to predict the limited supply number with partial information before the auction.",

keywords = "Auction design, Data-driven methods, Incentive compatibility, Limited supply, Metaverse swap, Platform escrow",

author = "Yifang Ding and Xu, \{Su Xiu\} and Meng Cheng and Sini Guo and Kong, \{Xiang T.R.\} and Huang, \{George Q.\}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2025 Elsevier Ltd",

year = "2026",

month = jun,

doi = "10.1016/j.omega.2025.103482",

language = "English",

volume = "141",

journal = "Omega (United Kingdom)",

issn = "0305-0483",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Data-driven auction design for blockchain-based digital asset trading

T2 - A mixed method

AU - Ding, Yifang

AU - Xu, Su Xiu

AU - Cheng, Meng

AU - Guo, Sini

AU - Kong, Xiang T.R.

AU - Huang, George Q.

PY - 2026/6

Y1 - 2026/6

N2 - This paper is motivated by a real project with a leading culture assets and equity swap organization in South China. Our preliminary survey assesses the potential of digital collectibles swap, with professionals aiming to boost liquidity and consumers driven by social attributes and meta-item diversity. In our setting, each agent owns a digital asset and wants another meta-item. However, the traditional Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction runs at a deficit. We thus introduce a novel mechanism that combines the VCG auction with limited supply and platform escrow concepts, called LSE-VCG auction. To improve the surplus of platform (auctioneer), we use limited supply to constrain the number of winners and platform escrow to increase market demand. The LSE-VCG auction and its externality-inclusive variant satisfy both truthful telling and participation rationality. If multilateral matching achieves maximal social welfare, then the substitute condition does not hold (impossibility theorem). We prove that the platform's surplus can be improved by limited supply in some conditions. Our experimental results show that the VCG auction solely with limited supply could reach greater social welfare, agents’ profits and ratio of swap relative to the sequential Vickrey auctions. Moreover, a mix of limited supply and platform escrow schemes can further improve the platform's profit and successful trading ratio. For the platform, truthful telling is a desirable strategy that brings high revenues, which promotes a transparent and beneficial auction environment. Besides, the impacts of externalities, auction timing, market size, value distribution and size of XOR bids are investigated. Furthermore, our auction mechanism is likely effective in addressing large-scale problems. Finally, we apply four effective machine learning methods to predict the limited supply number with partial information before the auction.

AB - This paper is motivated by a real project with a leading culture assets and equity swap organization in South China. Our preliminary survey assesses the potential of digital collectibles swap, with professionals aiming to boost liquidity and consumers driven by social attributes and meta-item diversity. In our setting, each agent owns a digital asset and wants another meta-item. However, the traditional Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction runs at a deficit. We thus introduce a novel mechanism that combines the VCG auction with limited supply and platform escrow concepts, called LSE-VCG auction. To improve the surplus of platform (auctioneer), we use limited supply to constrain the number of winners and platform escrow to increase market demand. The LSE-VCG auction and its externality-inclusive variant satisfy both truthful telling and participation rationality. If multilateral matching achieves maximal social welfare, then the substitute condition does not hold (impossibility theorem). We prove that the platform's surplus can be improved by limited supply in some conditions. Our experimental results show that the VCG auction solely with limited supply could reach greater social welfare, agents’ profits and ratio of swap relative to the sequential Vickrey auctions. Moreover, a mix of limited supply and platform escrow schemes can further improve the platform's profit and successful trading ratio. For the platform, truthful telling is a desirable strategy that brings high revenues, which promotes a transparent and beneficial auction environment. Besides, the impacts of externalities, auction timing, market size, value distribution and size of XOR bids are investigated. Furthermore, our auction mechanism is likely effective in addressing large-scale problems. Finally, we apply four effective machine learning methods to predict the limited supply number with partial information before the auction.

KW - Auction design

KW - Data-driven methods

KW - Incentive compatibility

KW - Limited supply

KW - Metaverse swap

KW - Platform escrow

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105023821191

U2 - 10.1016/j.omega.2025.103482

DO - 10.1016/j.omega.2025.103482

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:105023821191

SN - 0305-0483

VL - 141

JO - Omega (United Kingdom)

JF - Omega (United Kingdom)

M1 - 103482

ER -

Data-driven auction design for blockchain-based digital asset trading: A mixed method

摘要

访问文件

其它文件与链接

学术指纹

引用此