TY - JOUR
T1 - Enabling enterprise coordination without fiscal burden
T2 - New policy pathways for coal waste management
AU - Ge, Jiaojiao
AU - Ran, Lun
AU - Wang, Jiancai
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2026 Elsevier Ltd
PY - 2026/6
Y1 - 2026/6
N2 - Coal-fired power plants generate substantial waste that requires green pretreatment before valorization, yet high costs and demand uncertainty discourage investment. Although government subsidies are often advocated to promote waste management, this study focuses on an implementable, enterprise-led alternative: recycler-provided pretreatment cost sharing as a contract-based mechanism within the supply chain, alongside recycler-to-plant demand information sharing. Using a game-theoretic model with demand uncertainty and quality differentiation, we compare equilibrium outcomes under four coordination regimes: no cooperation, information sharing only, subsidization only, and a combined mechanism. Results show that information transparency robustly improves coordination by enabling state-contingent pretreatment decisions and sustaining mutual profitability across diverse market conditions. Subsidization increases pretreatment by relieving the plant's effective cost burden, but its attractiveness to the recycler is limited by direct payment costs, implying that cost-sharing requires targeted, performance-linked design. Combining the two instruments can strengthen outcomes under uncertainty but often provides limited incremental benefits beyond transparency. Policy implications emphasize prioritizing transparency infrastructure, standardized disclosure, and data governance as a baseline, while facilitating subsidy-like cost sharing selectively in contexts where quality premia and uncertainty make cost relief more likely to generate shared gains.
AB - Coal-fired power plants generate substantial waste that requires green pretreatment before valorization, yet high costs and demand uncertainty discourage investment. Although government subsidies are often advocated to promote waste management, this study focuses on an implementable, enterprise-led alternative: recycler-provided pretreatment cost sharing as a contract-based mechanism within the supply chain, alongside recycler-to-plant demand information sharing. Using a game-theoretic model with demand uncertainty and quality differentiation, we compare equilibrium outcomes under four coordination regimes: no cooperation, information sharing only, subsidization only, and a combined mechanism. Results show that information transparency robustly improves coordination by enabling state-contingent pretreatment decisions and sustaining mutual profitability across diverse market conditions. Subsidization increases pretreatment by relieving the plant's effective cost burden, but its attractiveness to the recycler is limited by direct payment costs, implying that cost-sharing requires targeted, performance-linked design. Combining the two instruments can strengthen outcomes under uncertainty but often provides limited incremental benefits beyond transparency. Policy implications emphasize prioritizing transparency infrastructure, standardized disclosure, and data governance as a baseline, while facilitating subsidy-like cost sharing selectively in contexts where quality premia and uncertainty make cost relief more likely to generate shared gains.
KW - Coal-fired power plant
KW - Information transparency
KW - Subsidy mechanisms
KW - Supply chain coordination
KW - Waste pretreatment
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105030656473
U2 - 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115195
DO - 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115195
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:105030656473
SN - 0301-4215
VL - 213
JO - Energy Policy
JF - Energy Policy
M1 - 115195
ER -